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The power to define is the power to control; therefore the author believes
governmental definitions of religion are to be avoided as inherently viola-
tive of the first amendment. While the meaning of religion must be con-
strued when dealing with cases arising under the first amendment and
statutes concerning religion, there is danger in adopting any specific defi-
nition that may result in the static recognition of existing norms, thus tac-
itly establishing existing religions against developing religions. Further,
the inquiry necessarily involved in determining if an institution meets a
particular definition may itself result in unconstitutional entanglement.
What is '"religion" and what regulation thereof is permissible is first ex-
amined in cases involving the religion clauses of the first amendment. The
free exercise and establishment clauses are examined in light of several
important cases including those concerning religiously prescribed polyg-
amy and transcendental meditation. The cases demonstrate the refusal of
federal courts to adopt explicit criteria defining religion, and recognize
that the protected exercise of religion is broader than activities strictly re-
ligious in nature. This theme is reinforced by a discussion offederal, state,
and local legislation involving such diverse areas as the selective service,
employment, property tax exemption, and zoning. Discussion then shifts
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to what the author perceives as a dangerous trend toward rigid definition
of "church," and functional categorization of "religious institutions." This
trend is most visible in Internal Revenue statutes and regulations. Criteria
adopted by the IRS to determine if an organization is a "church" tend to
unconstitutionally establish religion by specifying the structure necessary
to obtain the protection afforded to "churches." Such criteria inevitably re-
sult in legal force being given to the government's perception of religion.
Development of governmentally created categories of religious organiza-
tions, such as "integrated auxiliaries, "places the government in the uncon-
stitutional role of deciding the nature of the proper function of the church.
Such categorization also runs contrary to established principles which rec-
ognize that first amendment protection is not limited to purely religious
acts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment begins, "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. . . ." But what is "religion" under the first amend-
ment? What does the first amendment mean for religious institu-
tions which perform certain secular functions? How religious
must an organization be before it is entitled to first amendment
protections, and are there any gradations with respect to such
protections? What definitional lines can be drawn around the
term "church" which are consistent with the first amendment?
These issues arise in the interpretation of the first amendment
and of statutes which contain special provisions for religion or re-
ligious institutions.
The "definitional problem" is becoming more acute as a result
of the increasing wordage in our statutes and regulations, and the
desire to express requirements in closely defined terms, part of
the more general move away from a common or case law system
and towards a civil or codified system. Another factor which
serves to exacerbate the definitional problem is the tendency to
limit to a particular class of religious organizations exemptions
which once applied generally to religious organizations. Thus, a
number of categories of religious organizations have been estab-
lished legislatively which may or may not correspond to catego-
ries that churches recognize.'
An understanding of what constitutes "religion" or "church" is
essential to decision-making where religion and religious institu-
tions are concerned. A very different issue is posed, however, by
government definition of religion or religious institutions. Our
law presumes that government officials are not qualified to make
judgments in the area of religion which are enforceable against
the public. If officials-either elected or appointed-are permitted
to construct definitions in those areas where they are forbidden to
1. See notes 114-23 infra, and accompanying text.
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discriminate, they may impose by definitional form that which
they are forbidden to impose by direct decree. This article will
examine the legal interpretation as to what constitute religion
and religious institutions, and will review governmental efforts to
define them. It will attempt to reach an understanding-not a def-
inition--of "religion" under the first amendment in both its indi-
vidual and institutional expression.
II. WHAT IS "RELIGION"?
There is a tale about a woman attending the Sunday service of
a fashionable Episcopalian church. Her frequent exclamations of
"Hallelujah!" and "Amen, brother!" caused an usher to approach
her. Peering over his glasses, he inquired, "Is anything wrong?"
"Why," she replied, "I've got religion!" "But Madam," the startled
gentleman responded, "This is an Episcopal church. This is no
place to have religion," whereupon the usher escorted her out of
the church. Religion clearly means different things to different
people-including people who consider themselves religious.
A. Religion Under the First Amendment
The question of what constitutes religion under the first amend-
ment has arisen in cases applying the establishment clause, the
free exercise clause, or both, to governmental actions. These pro-
scriptions against the federal government are applicable to state
governments through the fourteenth amendment.2
1. The Free Exercise Clause
The term "free exercise" necessarily implies action, not merely
thought processes. Thus, the first amendment mandates protec-
tion for action which springs from religious belief as well as pro-
tection for belief itself.
There are two kinds of governmental action which can be detri-
mental to religious practice. The first is action directed specifi-
cally against a particular religion, such as a law prohibiting the
conducting of public worship services on Saturday. Such a law
would obviously have only one purpose-the inhibition of reli-
gious worship by sects which observe a Saturday Sabbath. This
would clearly violate the free exercise clause. The second type of
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
governmental action does not have as its purpose the infringe-
ment of religious freedom of particular sects, but the furtherance
of a state interest. However, it would either require action which
is forbidden by the tenets of a particular religion, or would man-
date action proscribed by a religion. Such a law is not "religious"
for purposes of the establishment clause, i.e., state requirements
in that area do not constitute an establishment of religion. Never-
theless, the free exercise clause may require the state to exempt
the believer from the enforcement of that law. 3 Of course, laws
can be passed which purport to regulate areas within the police
power of the state for secular reasons, but are, in fact, aimed at
suppressing a particular religion.4
It seems unlikely that a law wholly within category one, aimed
explicitly against the worship of certain sects, could be held con-
stitutional. 5 As a result of our nation's proud tradition of religious
freedom and a generally felt requirement that legislation at least
appear religiously neutral, most free exercise cases have arisen
under the second category of law-laws which effectuate a state
interest, but run contrary to certain religious teachings. In these
cases, courts must draw the line between action which is pro-
tected under the free exercise clause, and that which can legiti-
3. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish cannot be required to
send their children to high school contrary to their religious beliefs); Teterud v.
Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), affid, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (state
prison regulation on hair length cannot be enforced in the face of an Indian's free
exercise claim); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)
(en banc) (state law against possession of peyote cannot be enforced against Nav-
ajo members of the Native American Church who use peyote in religious wor-
ship). Although free exercise claims were upheld in these areas, it is extremely
unlikely that the state could be prevented from imposing requirements regarding
compulsory school attendance, hair length in prisons, or possession of halluci-
nogens on the grounds that an unconstitutional establishment of religion resulted.
4. See, e.g., Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 9 (1890) (act of Con-
gress limiting the value of the real estate which could be held by a religious or
charitable corporation in any territory). See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334
(1890) (territorial statute requiring persons registering to vote to swear that they
did not belong to any organization which counselled its members to commit big-
amy, polygamy, or any other crime). These cases are discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 22-32 infra.
5. Where a practice associated with a particular form of religious worship is
considered highly dangerous, however, it has been held that the state may forbid
the practice specifically in the context of worship. In Lawson v. Commonwealth,
291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942), the court held constitutional a statute which
made it a misdemeanor for any person to "display, handle or use any kind of
snake or reptile in connection with any religious service or gathering." Id. at 438,
164 S.W.2d at 972. See also Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956);
Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). These cases upheld, against a
free exercise claim, the enforcement of statutes forbidding the handling of danger-
ous snakes so as to endanger the health of another. The dangers associated with
snake handling are so evident, however, that this cannot really be considered a
prohibition specifically against worship, even if it appears in this context.
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mately be regulated. As the Supreme Court has stated, the first
amendment "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be."6 Tests which have been used to determine
where the line falls between protected and unprotected conduct
are "compelling state interest"7 and "the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests."8 The approach adopted by the
Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner9 was to examine whether
state action burdened the free exercise of religion; and, if so, to
weigh the infringement against any compelling state interest ef-
fectuated by the state's action.'0
The free exercise clause has been held to prevent enforcement
of state prison regulations against long hair," state statutes for-
bidding possession of peyote,12 and state laws requiring high
school attendance. 13 Laws which have been enforced despite a
free exercise objection include laws against polygamy,14 Sunday
closing laws, 15 and child labor laws.' 6 Courts have split on the is-
sue of whether a blood transfusion can be administered contrary
to an individual's religious beliefs.17
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Surinach v. Pesquera de Bus-
quets, 604 F.2d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1979); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d
813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964) (en banc); Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App.
3d 952, 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 256 (1977); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29
(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1979).
8. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
9. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
10. Id. at 403-09.
11. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), affid, 522 F.2d 357
(8th Cir. 1975). But see New Rider v. Board of Educ. of Independent School Dist.
No. 1, 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973). In New Rider, the court refused to require that
minor Pawnee Indian students be exempted, on free exercise and other grounds,
from a school hair regulation, stating- "The judiciary is not designed to operate
and manage school systems." Id. at 700.
12. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (en
banc).
13. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
15. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See also McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Maryland Sunday closing law not unconstitutional under the
establishment clause).
16. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
17. Compare In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1007-10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), with In re Estate of
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 441-42 (1965). See Byrn, Compulsory
The first major line of cases interpreting the free exercise
clause involved the nineteenth century Mormons, who held that it
was a religious duty, circumstances permitting, to practice polyg-
amy. In Reynolds v. United States,18 the Supreme Court held that
it was not error for a court to refuse to charge a jury that if the
defendant believed he was married in accordance with a religious
duty, he must be found not guilty of bigamy. The Court stated:
"The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must
go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning ".... 19 After
reviewing statements made by Jefferson and Madison, the Court
concluded that under the first amendment "Congress was de-
prived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free
to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order."20 To excuse polygamy on religious grounds
would "make the professed doctrine of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect ... permit every citizen to be-
come a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name
under such circumstances." 2 1
A decade later the Court upheld a statute of Idaho, then a terri-
tory, which required individuals registering to vote to swear that
they did not belong to an organization which taught or en-
couraged polygamy.22 Defendant, a Mormon, asserted that the
statute violated the free exercise clause. The Court reaffirmed its
position in Reynolds: "Whilst legislation for the establishment of
a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise permitted, it does not
follow that everything which may be so called can be tolerated.
Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any par-
ticular sect may designate as religion."23 The first amendment
provides no protection, the Court stated, for "acts inimical to the
peace, good order and morals of society."24
Finally, the Supreme Court upheld an act of Congress dissolv-
ing the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormon
Church) as a Utah corporation.25 The act required the United
States Attorney General to institute escheat proceedings against
the real property of the dissolved corporation acquired after 1862,
to the extent that the total real property held exceeded $50,000 in
Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10-13, 17-19
(1975).
18. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id. at 166-67.
22. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
23. Id. at 345.
24. Id. at 342.
25. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
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value. Property used exclusively for religious worship, as a par-
sonage, or as a burial ground, was exempted from forfeiture. The
proceeds of the escheated property were to be used for the com-
mon schools in the territory where the property was located.26 At
the time the case was decided, the property of the dissolved cor-
poration was in the custody of a receiver pending final disposi-
tion.27 Church members alleged, and the United States did not
deny, that the receiver held over $750,000 worth of real and per-
sonal property which had belonged to the corporation, exclusive
of Temple Block.28
The question, therefore, is whether the promotion of such a nefarious sys-
tem and practice [polygamy], so repugnant to our laws and to the princi-
ples of our civilization, is to be allowed to continue by the sanction of the
government itself; and whether the funds accumulated for that purpose
shall be restored to the same unlawful uses as heretofore, to the detri-
ment of the true interest of civil society.2 9
The answer was no. The Court upheld the dissolution of the
Church as a corporation.
The dissent stated that although Congress could suppress
crime in the territories, even though the crime was allegedly sanc-
tioned by religious belief, Congress exceeded its delegated pow-
ers by ordering the Church's property to be arbitrarily disposed
of by "judicial legislation." 30
Congress has the power to extirpate polygamy in any of the Territories, by
the enactment of a criminal code directed to that end; but it is not author-
ized under the cover of that power to seize and confiscate the property of
persons, individuals, or corporations, without office found, because they
may have been guilty of criminal practices.
3 1
Today's observer can conclude that in the long struggle be-
tween the Mormon Church and the United States, each side had a
partial victory: The Mormon Church survived, but it abandoned
its advocacy of polygamy.32
It appears, then, that the real question in free exercise cases is
not generally whether the free exercise is sought on behalf of
what qualifies as a "religion"-the Mormons, Jehovah's Wit-
26. Id. at 5-8.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id. at 14-19.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 67-68.
31. Id. at 67.
32. For a lengthier treatment of this subject, see Linford, The Mormons and the
Law: The Polygamy Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 543 (1964-1965).
nesses, 33 Amish,34 Orthodox Jews,35 members of the Native Amer-
ican Church,36 and Seventh-day Adventists 37 certainly meet this
criterion-but the extent of the deviation from established norms
which society is willing to accept when a religion is involved. The
practices sought to be protected are not in themselves "religious
acts," or government would be precluded from legislation in that
area by the establishment clause. The term which is actually the
source of the dispute is not "religion" but "free exercise."
It has been urged that for free exercise purposes, "religion"
should be defined as an individual's "ultimate concern," a phrase
developed by Paul Tillich.38 The following statement by Judge
Augustus Hand is quoted to support this position: "Religious be-
lief. . . is a belief finding expression in a conscience which cate-
gorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-
interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing
its tenets."39 Reasons advocated for the "ultimate concern" defi-
nition are that because it focuses on function, not content, it does
not prejudice free exercise by imposing unnecessary preconcep-
tions; it is adequately limited because it excludes beliefs capable
of compromise; and it is consistent with the preferred status
given to religious freedom under the first amendment because of
the importance which the law should attach to the ultimate con-
cerns of individuals. 40
There are several problems with the "ultimate concern" ap-
proach. First of all, it essentially defines religion out of existence
by defining religion solely in terms of psychology. One discipline
is thus put in the position of defining another-presumably, only
a psychologist could determine what was an individual's ultimate
concern. A federal district court rejected a similar approach in an
establishment clause context,41 considering it unworkable:
The only inquiry left to the courts would be into the sincerity with which
the proponents hold their systems of classification. "Religion" under the
first amendment would take on a different meaning in each case, and simi-
lar or virtually identical practices would be religious or not religious under
33. See notes 16-17 supra, and accompanying text.
34. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
35. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
37. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
38. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L." REV.
1056, 1075 (1978).
39. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943), quoted in Note,
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 1061, 1075
n.108 (1978).
40. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1075 (1978).
41. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1319 (D.N.J. 1977), affid per curiam, 592
F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
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the first amendment depending on the classification system of a particular
proponent.
4 2
Another problem with this definition is that it defines the na-
ture of the concern solely in terms of the intensity with which the
concern is held. These two things can be related, but they need
not be. Although some individuals may feel very intensely about
religious matters, most probably do not. An ultimate concern is
said to involve "an act of the total personality. '43 Does this stan-
dard apply to the Christmas and Easter churchgoer? Should not
this individual's right of religious free exercise be protected?
Imposing a "martyrdom" standard as a condition for religious
free exercise is a dubious proposition indeed. Such a standard in-
vites inquisitorial methods as a test of individual sincerity. Fur-
thermore, it is totally unwarranted by the Constitution, which
guarantees religious freedom without imposing any requirements
on the individual who wishes to exercise that freedom. Should
other first amendment guarantees-freedom of speech, freedom
of the press, and the rights to assemble and to petition for re-
dress-be limited only to those brave individuals who are willing
to die for them? Obviously, a society free only for would-be mar-
tyrs is not a free society. It is the more timid soul who has a more
urgent need for the first amendment's protection.
Hence, although the "ultimate concern" definition may have
some immediate appeal, in actuality it is anti-libertarian. What it
attempts to do, at best, is to recast the first amendment to pro-
hibit infringements of the "rights of conscience." An early draft of
the first amendment did just this," but this language was not
adopted.
2. The Establishment Clause
As with the free exercise clause, the central question in estab-
lishment clause cases has not generally been whether govern-
ment involvement was with a "religion," but whether the nature
of the involvement compromised the establishment clause. Es-
tablishment clause cases have dealt primarily with state financial
aid to religious institutions, 45 religious instruction or worship in
42. 440 F. Supp. at 1318.
43. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1076 n.110 (1978).
44. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 130 (rev. ed. 1967).
45. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for
public schools,46 state participation in religious holiday observ-
ances,47 state resolution of ecclesiastical controversies, 48 and reli-
gious tests for public office.49
A recent case focusing on the meaning of "religion," rather than
"establishment," under the establishment clause is Malnak v.
Yogi.50 This case dealt with the constitutionality of offering elec-
tive courses in the "Science of Creative Intelligence," including
Transcendental Meditation, in New Jersey public high schools. If
the teaching was religious, the violation of the establishment
clause was clear. 51
Defendants argued that the teaching was not religious for pur-
poses of the establishment clause. They said that although reli-
gion should be broadly defined for free exercise purposes, for
establishment clause purposes a narrower "substantive and con-
textual" approach should be used.52 Defendants urged the court
to develop a definition of religion for establishment clause pur-
poses which would exclude theories or practices (1) not associ-
ated with attributes such as houses of worship, priests, doctrines
on after-life and salvation, and symbols, and (2) not considered
by adherents to be religious. 53
In discussing the scope of "religion" under the establishment
clause, the court stated:
Defendants point out that none of the above-discussed decisions explic-
itly defined religion within the meaning of the first amendment. The lack
of a precise definition is not surprising in light of the fact that a constitu-
tional provision is involved. This court knows of no decision defining
press or speech within the meaning of the first amendment. The meaning
of these terms, and many other constitutional terms, have expanded with
the passage of time and the development of the nation .... New religions
appear in this country frequently and they cannot stand outside the first
amendment merely because they did not exist when the Bill of Rights was
drafted.5 4
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
47. E.g., Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Curran v. Lee, 484 F.2d
1348 (2d Cir. 1973).
48. E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 440 U.S. 903 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), noted in 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 992 (1977); Presby-
terian Church v. Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679
(1872).
49. E.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
50. 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), affd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. 440 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
52. Id. at 1315-17 & n.20.
53. Id. at 1326.
54. Id. at 1315.
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The court found it "unnecessary to improvise an unprecedented
definition of religion under the first amendment,"5 5 stating that
"the underlying teachings fall well within the concepts which
courts previously have found to be religious."56
The court also rejected the dual definition of religion for estab-
lishment and free exercise purposes advocated by the defendants,
quoting Mr. Justice Rutledge:
"Religion" appears only once in the [First] Amendment. But the word
governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. "Thereof" brings down
"religion" with its entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the
first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as
broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other.
5 7
The rejection of the dual approach would automatically eliminate
the "ultimate concern" definition of religion under the free exer-
cise clause since, as its proponents have recognized,5 8 such a def-
nition would be totally unworkable under the establishment
clause.
The Malnak court did not accept defendants' contention that
religion under the establishment clause should be construed in
narrow, institutional terms: "In implementing the establishment
clause, the Supreme Court has made clear that an activity may be
religious even though it is neither part of nor derives from a soci-
etally recognized religious sect."59 The Supreme Court had ear-
lier interpreted religion under the establishment clause in broad,
non-institutional terms. In Engel v. Vitale,60 the Court dealt with
the New York "Regents' prayer," composed by state officials and
recommended for recitation by public school students at the be-
ginning of the school day.6 1 Although institutional religion was
not an issue, the Supreme Court held that the prayer involved re-
ligious activity, and that use of the public school system to pro-
mote recitation of such a governmentally prescribed prayer
violated the establishment clause.62 In Torcaso v. Watkins,63 the
55. Id. at 1320.
56. Id. at 1325.
57. Id. at 1316 n.20. Dissenting Justice Rutledge was joined by three justices
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), but on this point he was not in dis-
agreement with the opinion of the Court.
58. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1084 (1978).
59. 440 F. Supp. at 1313.
60. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
61. Id. at 422-23.
62. Id. at 424.
63. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Court had rejected, as unconstitutional, a state requirement that
appointees to state offices affirm a belief in God to obtain their
commissions. 64 Although, as in Engel, no particular religious sect
was involved, federal or state government could not use religious
tests to limit public offices to officials advocating a "particular
kind of religious concept."65 Such an approach would bar mem-
bers of nontheistic religions from holding office, as well as non-
religious people.
The Malnak defendants' second proposed requirement for a
teaching or practice to be held religious under the establishment
clause, that it be characterized by its proponents as religious, was
likewise rejected by the court. The court felt that to place deter-
minative weight on such a subjective element would introduce a
variable precluding a "fair and uniform standard," and would
overemphasize the court's assessment of individual sincerity. It
would also be inappropriate where the proponents of the beliefs
and practices under scrutiny had enlisted government aid to sup-
port these practices. 66 Although the characterization by propo-
nents was relevant, they could not receive state aid to promulgate
concepts recognized by society to be religious merely because
they viewed these concepts as secular.67
The Malnak court found that the course in the Science of Crea-
tive Intelligence was "religious" under the establishment clause
in two significant respects. First, the textbook described an ulti-
mate reality "which in its various forms is given the name 'god' in
common usage."68 Second, the court found that the puja chant,
sung to a dead human being, was a prayer.69 The fact that prayer
is religious in nature has been recognized by a number of
courts.
70
Consequently, a judicial determination was reached without the
aid of a definition of religion for first amendment or for establish-
64. Id. at 496.
65. Id. at 494.
66. 440 F. Supp. at 1318-20.
67. Though the subjective characterization of a practice as "religious" is nec-
essary in free exercise cases, because otherwise the question of state infringement
against protected religious activity would never arise, it is of much lesser signifi-
cance in establishment clause cases. In the latter, the violation is considered to be
against a broad societal grouping-such as taxpayers-rather than against the par-
ticular individuals involved. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The fact that
an involved individual does not consider a government-funded activity religious
does not mitigate the violation if the mass of taxpayers do consider it religious.
68. 440 F. Supp. at 1320.
69. Id. at 1323.
70. Id., citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and DeSpain v. DeKalb Com-
munity School Dist. 428, 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906
(1968).
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ment clause purposes. In fact, the court explicitly refrained from
the adoption of any definitive criteria, noting that courts had
"avoided the establishment of explicit criteria, the possession of
which indelibly identifies an activity as religious for purposes of
the first amendment."7 1
B. Statutory Definitions
1. Federal Law
In some matters, Congress, seeking to promote the values of the
first amendment, has historically enacted statutory exemptions or
accommodations for religious belief and practice, even though not
required to do so by the free exercise clause. When such an ex-
emption or accommodation exists, the question of the "religion"
entitled to it arises. Religion under a statute need not mean the
same thing as religion under the first amendment, but they tend
to influence one another.
In 1931, the Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that a native-born
American has no constitutional right to exemption from the com-
pulsory bearing of military arms. 72 Forty years later, the Court
said prior decisions had "suggested" that conscientious objection
was not a constitutional right.73 Nevertheless, Congress provided
an exemption for religious objectors in the selective draft acts of
1864 and 1917.74 In 1940, the exemption was no longer limited to a
member of a "well-recognized religious sect or organization" with
appropriate beliefs, but applied to any person "who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in war in any form."75
At the time the Supreme Court interpreted the conscientious
objector provision in United States v. Seeger,76 the statute pro-
vided:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's be-
lief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
71. 440 F. Supp. at 1312.
72. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931).
73. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971).
74. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9; Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40
Stat. 78 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976)). -
75. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889 (cur-
rent version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976)). The "well-recognized religious sect
or organization" restriction was contained in Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat.
78 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976)).
76. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. 7 7
The Court, confronted by claims of conscientious objector status
by individuals who did not assert a belief in God, stated:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Be-
ing" rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning
of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to ex-
clude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views [and that]
the test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its pos-
sessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption.
7 8
Thus, the claimed status was granted.
Congress subsequently amended the statute to eliminate the
"Supreme Being" requirement.7 9 Yet in Welsh v. United States,8 0
the Court was faced with a conscientious objection claim by an in-
dividual who initially refused to categorize his objection as reli-
gious. In a letter to his Appeal Board, he clarified his position by
saying that his beliefs "were certainly religious in the ethical
sense of the word."81 The Court again enlarged the apparent
scope of the statute, and held:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethi-
cal or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him
a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time,
those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel
to that filled by ... God" in traditional religious persons.8 2
The Court stated that the statute was intended to bar objector
status to those whose beliefs rested "solely upon considerations
of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." 83
Another federal statutory area where the term "religion" must
be interpreted is that of employment discrimination. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor union to discriminate against an in-
dividual on account of his race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.84 Although private parties are not covered by constitutional
77. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (current version at
50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976)). The "Supreme Being" language was added after
the decision in Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 795 (1946), in which objector status was denied to a socialist who opposed war
as morally wrong. The nature of the religious belief required for draft exemption
was also discussed in United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir.
1943), and United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
78. 380 U.S. at 165-66.
79. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 104
(current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976)).
80. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
81. Id. at 341.
82. Id. at 340.
83. Id. at 343.
84. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a) to (c), 78 Stat. 255-56
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1976)).
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proscriptions against governmental activity,85 the inclusion of reli-
gion in Title VII represents another congressional effort to pro-
mote the first amendment value of religious freedom.
A proposed revision of its Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Religion recently issued by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) states the following:
[Tjhe Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethi-
cal beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the
strength of traditional religious views. . . . The fact that no religious group
espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the in-
dividual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine
whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective em-
ployee.
8 6
The Proposed Guidelines state that the Commission has consis-
tently used the Seeger and Welsh standard in its decisions. 87
2. State and Local Law
Two primary areas in which the term "religion" has been at is-
sue in state and local law are those of real property tax exemp-
tion and zoning restrictions.
The law of New York State provides some helpful illustrations
in this regard. The New York State Constitution provides:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Ex-
emptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or per-
sonal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable
purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association
organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and
not operating for profit.8 8
In People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc. v. Har-
ing,89 the New York Court of Appeals had to determine whether a
farm owned by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc., the
governing body of the Jehovah's Witnesses, qualified for exemp-
tion. Almost all the farm's produce was used to feed employees at
the headquarters of the Society or at a Bible school conducted by
it. In determining whether the farm met the pertinent statutory
requirements for exemption-ownership by a religious, Bible, or
85. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-73 (1972).
86. Proposed Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 44 Fed. Reg.
53706, 53706-07 (1979) (would amend 29 C.F.R. § 1605), citing Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
87. 44 Fed. Reg. 53706, 53707 (1979).
88. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (McKinney 1969).
89. 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960).
tract corporation and use exclusively for such purposes 9O-the
court stated: "Historically and in reason, the only test is whether
the farm operation is reasonably incident to the major purpose of
its owner. There can be no doubt about that here."91 Thus, the
exemption was won.
In 1971, the New York Real Property Tax Law was amended.
Mandatory exemptions were still provided for property owned by
charitable, religious, or educational corporations. 92 Municipalities,
however, were authorized to remove by local law exemptions for
organizations established not for the mandatorily exempt pur-
poses, but for other uses, including Bible, tract, and missionary
purposes. 9 3 Pursuant to this authority, New York City removed
all exemptions which were not mandatory,94 and considerable liti-
gation ensued.9 5
Two major cases dealing with the rather ingenious distinction
between "religious purposes" and "Bible, tract, and missionary
purposes" are Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc. v.
Lewisohn9 6 and American Bible Society v. Lewisohn.9 7 In the
Watchtower case, the court held that the state taxing authority
must not only prove that the corporate owner of the property was
organized exclusively for Bible and tract purposes, but also that it
was not organized or conducted exclusively for religious pur-
poses. It concluded that the state failed to meet the latter re-
quirement. The court noted that the Society was the governing
body of a recognized religious denomination, and that the house-
to-house preaching of the Jehovah's Witnesses-which included
the distribution of religious literature published by the Society-
had been recognized by the courts to be a religious activity. Thus,
the court held that the Society was organized and conducted ex-
90. Ch. 959, § 420(1), 1958 N.Y. Laws 1396 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW § 421(1) (McKinney 1972)).
91. 8 N.Y.2d at 358, 170 N.E.2d at 681, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
92. Mandatory exemptions were also retained for corporations with hospital or
cometary purposes. Ch. 414, § 2, 1971 N.Y. Laws 598 (current version at N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAx LAW § 421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972)). Although this amendment elimi-
nated the moral or mental improvement of men and women as an exempt cate-
gory, this exemption was subsequently reenacted. Ch. 529, § 1, 1972 N.Y. Laws
1066-67 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421(1) (a) (McKinney
1972)).
93. Ch. 414, § 2, 1971 N.Y. Laws 598 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 421(1) (b) (McKinney 1972)).
94. New York City Local Law No. 46, CITY ADMIN. CODE § J51-3.0 (1975).
95. For a discussion of this litigation, particularly in regard to religious organi-
zations, see Note, Real Property Tax Exemption in New York: When Is a Bible So-
ciety Not Religious?, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 949 (1977).
96. 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315 N.E.2d 801, 358 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1974).
97. 48 App. Div. 2d 308, 369 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1975), affid, 40 N.Y.2d 78, 351 N.E.2d
697, 386 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976).
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elusively for religious purposes under the statute; consequently,
exemption of its property used for such purposes was required.
In the American Bible Society case, the Appellate Division held
that the Bible Society's main purpose was the distribution of Bi-
bles and thus it was a Bible society, not a religious organization.
Those "incidentally" derived benefits from the primary activity,
be they religious, educational, or moral or mental improvement,
were insufficient to require exemption under a mandatory cate-
gory. The court also held that the distinction thus drawn was con-
sistent with the New York State Constitution. The dissenting
opinion stated that to be consistent with the Watchtower case, a
finding that a primary purpose of the Bible Society was the distri-
bution of Bibles should not mean the promotion of religion was
merely incidental. The dissent would have held that the Bible So-
ciety's primary purpose was the promotion of religion by distrib-
uting Bibles on a nonprofit basis. Nevertheless, the denial of the
exemption was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.9 8
Another problem under real property tax exemption provisions
is posed by organizations with a structure similar to that of tradi-
tional churches, but which do not advocate belief in a Supreme
Being. The issue of whether such organizations' property was
used for "religious worship" was posed in Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda99 and Washington Ethical Society v. Dis-
trict of Columbia,1 00 both decided in 1957.
In Fellowship of Humanity, after discussing draft exemption
and other cases, the court concluded that it would be arbitrary in
light of our country's tradition of religious tolerance to limit "reli-
gion" to theistic beliefs, and stated that distinctions between
types of religious belief based on content would violate the first
amendment. Thus, whether or not an organization advocated be-
lief in a Supreme Being could not be made a factor in determin-
98. 40 N.Y.2d 78, 351 N.E.2d 697, 386 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976). A primary reason for
the Court of Appeals' affirmance was the fact that the American Bible Society was
not "directly associated with an organized religious denomination or with an or-
ganization having as its avowed purpose the furthering of a recognized religion."
Id. at 81, 351 N.E.2d at 698, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 50. Despite the trend towards restrict-
ing religious exemptions, it was subsequently held that property owned by a reli-
gious order, kept in its natural state, and intended for use as a religious retreat
qualified for the religious exemption. Order Minor Conventuals v. Lee, 64 App.
Div. 2d 227, 409 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1978).
99. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
100. 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
ing whether its property qualified for exemption.' 0 ' Using a
formulation later adopted in Seeger and Welsh, the court stated:
Thus the only inquiry in such a case is the objective one of whether or not
the belief occupies the same place in the lives of its holders that the ortho-
dox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing majorities, and whether a given
group that claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded
to be religious conduct themselves.
1 0 2
In seeking general characteristics of religion not based on the
content of religious beliefs, the court concluded:
Religion simply includes: (1) a belief, not necessarily referring to super-
natural powers; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious association openly ex-
pressing the belief; (3) a system of moral practice directly resulting from
an adherence to the belief; and (4) an organization within the cult
designed to observe the tenets of belief.10 3
In an effort to prevent the state from providing what the court
considered to be an indirect subsidy to religious worship in the
form of a tax-exemption, the court decided that exemption for
churches was based not on a church's religious functions, but on
"the many other things all churches do" such as welfare, charita-
ble, educational, and moral improvement activities. 0 4 In light of
this perceived requirement, the court stated:
The real question is whether the activities of the Fellowship of Humanity
101. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 691-92, 315 P.2d at 405-06. This argument actually as-
sumes what it is trying to prove, i.e., that a belief which does not include belief in
a Supreme Being is religious, and is therefore entitled to first amendment protec-
tion.
102. Id. at 692, 315 P.2d at 406.
103. Id. at 693, 315 P.2d at 406. Even this seemingly broad definition is some-
what deficient. Need members openly express their belief for it to qualify as a re-
ligion? Furthermore, in Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), affd per
curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979), although the defendants asserted that no sys-
tem of moral practice was associated with their teachings, the court held that this
did not mean that they were not propagating religion.
104. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 696-97, 315 P.2d at 409. The Supreme Court explicitly
refused to justify religious real property tax exemptions on such grounds in the
later case of Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), in which the Court held
such exemptions constitutional. The Court stated:
We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social welfare
services or "good works" that some churches perform for parishioners and
others-family counselling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to chil-
dren. Churches vary substantially in the scope of such services; programs
expand or contract according to resources and need. As public-sponsored
programs enlarge, private aid from the church sector may diminish. The
extent of social services may vary, depending on whether the church
serves an urban or rural, a rich or poor constituency. To give emphasis to
so variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would introduce an
element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of par-
ticular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-
to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.
Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant element to
qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to confrontations
that could escalate to constitutional dimensions.
Id. at 674. For a thorough study of reasons for tax exemption of nonprofit institu-
tions, see Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Fed-
eral Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
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which in the above sense are "nonreligious," and which include all the
Fellowship's activities, are analogous to the activities, serve the same
place in the lives of its members, and occupy the same place in society, as
the activities of the theistic churches.
1 0 5
Because this standard was met, the court determined that the
Fellowship of Humanity was entitled to the exemption. The court
also held that incidental use of the property for dinners, dances,
and miscellaneous meetings did not mean it was not used "solely
and exclusively" for religious worship under the statute.10 6
The dissent pointed out the intrinsic contradiction in the major-
ity opinion: While an organization must use its property solely for
religious purposes in order to qualify for the statutory exemption,
the exemption is granted on account of the social, cultural, and
moral purposes the organization serves. 07 What the majority
opinion did, in effect, was to eliminate religion as a basis of tax
exemption, and to allow these organizations-but not other types
of organizations-to obtain exemption on the basis of auxiliary ac-
tivities and effects rather than their primary purpose. The dissent
would have limited the exemption to religious worship centered
on a Supreme Being.108
The same issue was considered in Washington Ethical Society
v. District of Columbia,0 9 decided only weeks after Fellowship of
Humanity. The court here stated that because statutory exemp-
tion was granted to many types of nonprofit corporations, consti-
tutional issues might be raised if religious exemptions were
denied to organizations with unorthodox or minority forms of
worship, while granted to the religious majority. The court noted
that "Leaders" of the Washington Ethical Society were authorized
to perform marriages as individuals designated by a "church or
religious society." 0 Thus, the exemption was granted.
As in tax-exemption cases, zoning cases may require a determi-
105. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 698, 315 P.2d at 409-10.
106. Id. at 698-99, 315 P.2d at 410.
107. Id. at 703, 315 P.2d at 413 (Bray, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 705, 315 P.2d at 414. In so limiting the exemption, the dissent was out
of harmony with subsequent decisions, in which the trend has been to include
within the bounds of "religion" beliefs outside the monotheistic tradition. See text
accompanying notes 77-83 supra, and note 110 infra. Had the majority not been
forced into its intrinsically contradictory position by its efforts to justify tax ex-
emption on nonreligious grounds, a justification explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court (see note 104 supra), it would have been solidly in line with subse-
quent trends.
109. 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (opinion by Warren Burger, J.).
110. Id. at 128.
nation as to what constitutes a "religious use." Such cases have
generally given a fairly broad interpretation to this term, such as
the following from In re Community Synagogue v. Bates:
A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the opportunity
to worship God. Strictly religious uses and activities are more than prayer
and sacrifice and all churches recognize that the area of their responsibil-
ity is broader than leading the congregation in prayer. Churches have al-
ways developed social groups for adults and youth . . To limit a church
to being merely a house of prayer and sacrifice would, in a large degree,
be depriving the church of the opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and
strengthening itself and the congregation. 1 1 1
The Bates court held that use of synagogue property where public
worship was conducted for study, fellowship among adherents,
and community service, such as Red Cross and Scouting work,
did not remove it from the category of "strictly religious uses."
112
In summary, "religion" under federal and state statutes has
been held to encompass nontheistic beliefs which occupy a place
in the lives of their possessors parallel to that occupied by belief
in God in persons with traditional religious faith. Religious activi-
ties or uses have been held to include incidental social, charita-
ble, and maintenance activities (for both persons and property)
as well as religious worship.
III. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
The first amendment necessarily applies to religious institu-
tions as well as to individuals. Establishment has historically oc-
curred through powerful, well-funded church institutions.
Furthermore, since religion is almost always a corporate phenom-
enon, not a purely individual one, the right of free exercise inevi-
tably entails the right to form and operate religious institutions. 113
Some basic questions to be resolved are: What is a religious insti-
tution for purposes of the first amendment? What do first amend-
ment protections and restrictions mean for religious institutions?
Are there gradations of "religiosity" within religious institutions
which, in turn, require gradations of first amendment protection?
To what extent can government get involved in the business of
defining religious institutions before that involvement results in
unconstitutional excessive entanglement between government
and religion?
111. 1 N.Y.2d 445, 453, 136 N.E.2d 488, 493, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 21-22 (1956).
112. Id. at 452-53, 136 N.E.2d at 492-93, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
113. For a discussion of the applicability of the first amendment to religious in-
stitutions, see Worthing, The State Takes Over a Church, ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF
POL. & Soc. Sci., Nov. 1979, at 136.
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A. Types of Religious Institutions
An educated American, asked to name different types of reli-
gious institutions, might well list the following categories: (1)
churches; (2) charitable entities connected with churches, such as
schools, hospitals, and cemeteries; (3) religious publishing
houses, broadcasters or similar enterprises which may or may not
be run on a nonprofit basis; (4) missionary organizations; (5)
group ventures which serve constituent religious organizations;
and (6) religious orders. It is apparent that while all these organi-
zations should be considered religious, there are certain real dif-
ferences among them, and some varying legal treatment is
warranted.
Consider the following selection of categories of religious orga-
nizations from the Internal Revenue Code. These categories may
or may not be overlapping: "a religious organization described in
section 501(c)(3)";114 "a church or a convention or association of
churches";115 "religious order";116 "exclusively religious activities
of any religious order";117 "religious or apostolic associations or
corporations";1 8 "church agency";119 "an integrated auxiliary of a
church"; 20 a section 501(c) (3) organization "operated, supervised,
or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization de-
scribed in" section 501(c)(3);121 and an organization "operated
primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, super-
vised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or conven-
tion or association of churches.' 1 22 Section 501(c)(3) lists the
organizations broadly categorized as "charitable" which are ex-
empt from federal income tax, including religious organizations.
114. I.R.C. §§3121(b)(8)(B), 3303(e), 3306(c)(8), 6033(a)(2)(C)(i).
115. Id. §§ 170(b)(1) (A) (i), 410(d)(1), 414(e)(1)(A) and (3)(A), 501(h) (5) (B),
508(c)(1)(A), 512(b)(14), 514(b)(3)(E), 3309(b)(1), 6033(a)(2)(A)(i), 6043(b)(1),
7605(c).
116. Id. §§ 512(b) (12) and (15), 6033 (a) (2) (A) (iii). The phrase "religious order"
also appears in conjunction with "member" in sections 1402(a) (8), (c), and (e)(1),
3121(b)(8)(A)i (i)(4), (r)(1) and (2), 3309(b)(2), and 3401(a)(9).
117. Id. § 6033(a) (2) (A) (iii).
118. Id. § 501(d).
119. Id. § 414(e) (3).
120. Id. §§ 501(h) (5) (B), 508(c)(1) (A), 6033(a) (2) (A) (i), 6043(b)(1).
121. Id. § 6033(a)(2)(C)(iv).
122. Id. § 3309(b) (1) (B). These and other categories are discussed in more de-
tail in Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problem,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977).
A section 501(c) (3) organization is subject to the following restric-
tions:
[N]o part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation,
(except as otherwise provided . .. ), and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
12 3
It is apparent that some of these definitional categories are far
from obvious, and require rather fine distinctions and the devel-
opment of legal interpretations which are substantially unrelated
to the religious organizations' perception of themselves.
The Code's "integrated auxiliary" category is used to determine
whether or not an organization which is not a "church" or other-
wise exempted is (1) permitted to make the special election with
regard to expenditures to influence legislation;124 (2) required to
notify the Secretary of the Treasury that it is applying for recogni-
tion of exempt status;125 (3) required to file annual returns of
financial information with the Internal Revenue Service;126 and
(4) required to file a return with the Service upon dissolution. 27
An "integrated auxiliary" of a church is defined in Treasury
Regulations as an organization exempt from tax under section
501(c) (3) which is affiliated with a church and whose "principal
activity is exclusively religious."' 28 Examples are given which ex-
clude church-related hospitals, elementary grade schools, old age
homes, and orphanages from the "integrated auxiliary" category,
but include seminaries, men's fellowship associations, and reli-
123. It is noteworthy that by far the greater portion of the restrictive language
in this description deals with political activity. The matter of political activity by
religious organizations is a hotly contested issue. In Christian Echoes Nat'l Minis-
try, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973), revocation of Christian Echoes' tax-exempt status on account of its politi-
cal activities was upheld by the court of appeals. Christian Echoes conducted ra-
dio and television broadcasts, issued publications, and held evangelistic meetings.
Dr. Hargis, president of the organization, in his "battle against Communism, so-
cialism, and political liberalism," attacked President Kennedy, President Johnson,
and Senator Humphrey. 470 F.2d at 852, 856. Although IRS agents, after examining
the activities and financial affairs of Christian Echoes at the request of the Na-
tional Office, recommended no change in the organization's exempt status, the Na-
tional Office subsequently recommended that tax exemption be revoked. Id. at
852. There are bills pending in Congress which would greatly increase government
supervision over lobbying activities. Churches and other religious organizations
exempted from the information return requirement have been exempted from cov-
erage in recent versions of such legislation, however. S. 2160, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 4(c)(2) (1979); H.R. 4395, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(b)(2) (1979) (amended ver-
sion).
124. I.R.C. § 501(h) (5) (B).
125. Id. § 508(c)(1)(A).
126. Id. § 6033(a) (2) (A) (i).
127. Id. § 6043(b)(1).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g) (1976).
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gious youth organizations. 129 Proposed regulations substituted
the following language for the "principal activity" test: "[an organ-
ization] (a) whose primary purpose is to carry out the tenets,
functions, and principles of faith of the church with which it is af-
filiated, and (b) whose operations in implementing such primary
purpose directly promote religious activity among the members of
the church."1 30 The examples of "integrated auxiliaries" and non-
"integrated auxiliaries" were the same in the proposed and final
regulations.1 31
American churches displayed almost uniform opposition to the
proposed and final Treasury regulation defining "integrated auxil-
iary."132 A basic reason for the objection was a feeling that the
Service was imposing its own conception of religious mission
upon the churches, and that conception excluded the traditional
charitable, educational, and social welfare activities of
churches.133 This is contrary to the approach taken in the zoning
and real property tax exemption cases, where it has generally
been held that charitable and even recreational activities were
within the scope of church functions. 34
American churches felt that they, not the Internal Revenue
Service, were entitled to decide what constituted a function inte-
gral to their mission.135 A Baptist spokesman commenting on the
proposed regulation asserted that an activity need not be "reli-
gious" in the traditional sense to be integral to a church's mis-
129. Id.
130. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g) (5) (i), 41 Fed. Reg. 6073 (1976).
131. The Preamble to the final regulation announced, however, that church-
related educational organizations below the college level would be excepted from
the information return requirement pursuant to exercise of the Secretary's discre-
tionary authority. T.D. 7454, 1977-1 C.B. 366, 367. For a fuller treatment of the inte-
grated auxiliary question, see Note, The Internal Revenue Service as a Monitor of
Church Institutions: The Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 929
(1977).
132. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problem,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 895 (1977).
133. So integral are these activities to an American understanding of the role of
churches that they have been said to constitute the basis for church property tax
exemption (see text accompanying note 104 supra), though the Supreme Court
did not so hold. See note 104 supra.
134. See notes 88-91, 104-06, 111-12 supra, and accompanying text,
135. E.g., Statement of James E. Wood, Jr., Executive Director, Baptist Joint
Comm. on Pub. Affairs, at Internal Revenue Service Hearing on the Proposed Reg-
ulations Under Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code Relating to Definition of
Integrated Auxiliaries of a Church, Washington, D.C. (June 7, 1976), at 7.
sion.136 Of course, the final "exclusively religious" language
imposes an even more rigorous test. The final regulation pro-
vides: "An organization's principal activity will not be considered
to be exclusively religious if that activity is educational, literary,
charitable, or of another nature (other than religious) that would
serve as a basis for exemption under section 501(c)(3)."137 As
Charles Whelan has observed: "The churches are sure to insist
that they themselves are not 'exclusively religious' in the sense
that the final regulations require of their 'integrated auxilia-
ries.' "138
A strict application of this definition of integrated auxiliary
would defeat even examples which the final regulation lists as in-
tegrated auxiliaries. Many church youth groups could qualify as
section 501(c) (3) organizations without any church affiliation, and
consequently could be excluded from the integrated auxiliary
category. 39 Is the principal purpose of a men's fellowship associ-
ation "exclusively religious," or is it social with religious over-
tones? Is a men's fellowship association really more "religious"
than a parochial elementary school staffed by nuns with a heavy
emphasis on religious training?
It appears that, with the exception of seminaries, which obvi-
ously have the closest possible relationship to the religious func-
tions of churches, what the Service did in its final regulation was
to exclude from the category of integrated auxiliary those classes
of organizations which have substantial economic weight, thus re-
quiring them to file returns of financial information (unless ex-
cused in the exercise of the Secretary's discretion). The Service
included in this category organizations which usually have small
budgets and would have little to report in any case. Although the
definitional language in the proposed and final regulation varied,
the examples remained unchanged, showing where the true line
had been drawn.
The observation that an activity can be integral to a church's
mission without being "exclusively religious"--or even "reli-
gious"-is consistent with judicial interpretation of the free exer-
cise clause, which has required protection for various activities
which are not in themselves religious, but which spring from reli-
gious belief.l40 Refraining from work on the Sabbath is not in it-
self "religious," yet it is undeniably a central element in the
136. Id. at 5-6.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g) (5) (ii) (1976).
138. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problem,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 899 (1977).
139. Id.
140. See notes 3, 11-13 supra, and accompanying text.
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teachings of certain religions. Thus, to define the functions of cer-
tain church-related organizations in "exclusively religious" terms,
and to exclude from the category of "religious" anything which
might be perceived as charitable, educational, welfare, etc., is to
fail to understand the breadth of religious teachings. They en-
compass activities between man and man as well as man and
God. Churches and their organizations have historically not been
"exclusively religious" as perceived by the Service. This fact has
been recognized in the interpretation of other areas of law.14 1
The Executive Director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Pub-
lic Affairs, James E. Wood, Jr., asserted that the term "integrated
auxiliary" was meant to assess the relationship of an organization
to a church, not its degree of religiosity: "Congress intended that
there be a determination of a relationship. This the Treasury is
competent to do. Congress did not intend that the Treasury ei-
ther assess activities or determine whether those activities are in-
tegral to a church's religious mission. Only a church itself can
perform that task."1 42 Dr. Wood proposed that Treasury either
adopt the dictionary definitions of "integrated" and "auxiliary"
and apply them when the relationship between a church and aux-
iliary organizations was at issue, or that Treasury allow churches
to certify which organizations they considered integral to their re-
ligious missions.143 A similar certification procedure is presently
used in the granting of group exemption letters for purposes of
federal income tax exemption.'"
Another type of religious organization mentioned in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code is a section 501(c) (3) organization "which is
operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated,
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or
convention or association of churches."'145 Such an organization,
described in section 3309(b) (1) (B), is not required to be covered
by state unemployment tax laws in order for private employers in
141. See notes 88-91, 104-06, 111-12 supra, and accompanying text.
142. Statement of James E. Wood, Jr., Executive Director, Baptist Joint Comm.
on Pub. Affairs, at Internal Revenue Service Hearing on the Proposed Regulations
Under Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code Relating to Definition of Inte-
grated Auxiliaries of a Church, Washington, D.C. (June 7, 1976), at 5.
143. Id. at 6-7.
144. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(n) (8) (i) (a) (1979).
145. I.R.C. § 3309(b) (1) (B).
the state to receive the 90% credit against federal tax. 146
If churches were created by statute, such a complex, three-part
definition might make sense. In fact, Congress has not gone from
reality to the Code, but has attempted to impose Code concepts
on reality. Then governmental agencies apply Code concepts in a
way that slices religious organizations into units that fit the
Code-whether or not the organizations naturally fall into such
units. Thus, government description of religious categories is
leading subtly, but powerfully, towards statutory delineation of
churches.
There is currently a dispute as to whether a parochial school
qualifies as a section 3309(b) (1) (B) organization. Church officials
have asserted that it does; the Secretary of Labor says that it does
not. In a letter to the General Secretary of the United States
Catholic Conference, Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall stated that
the Department believed Congress "clearly" intended to require
state coverage of employees of church-related schools when it re-
pealed the statute's exemption for service performed for nonprofit
schools, effective in 1978.147 He concluded that in light of this re-
peal, the only services in parochial schools covered by the exemp-
tion for church institutions were "those strictly church duties
performed by church employees pursuant to their religious re-
sponsibilities within the schools."1 48
A letter sent out by the Department of Labor to all state em-
ployment security agencies announced the Secretary's "decision"
in this matter, and stated: "The exclusion contained in section
3309(b) (1) (B) applies only to services performed for organiza-
tions, other than educational institutions, that are church oper-
ated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported and whose
employees are primarily engaged in religious activities."1 49 Such
statutory construction might more appropriately be termed statu-
tory design. What type of organization's employees are "pri-
marily engaged in religious activities"? Does this description
apply to church janitors and maintenance workers, secretaries
who answer telephones, type letters, and arrange for meetings,
146. Id. §§ 3302, 3304(a) (6) (A), 3309(a) (1) (A). Churches need not be covered
either. Id. § 3309(b) (1) (A).
147. Letter from Ray Marshall to Thomas Kelly (April 18, 1978). Secretary Mar-
shall noted that more than 80% of the employees of nonprofit schools are em-
ployed in church-related schools. Id.
148. Id. This statute also exempts services performed by a minister in the ex-
ercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties
required by the order. I.R.C. § 3309(b)(2). This exemption was not affected by the
interpretation.
149. Lawrence W. Rogers, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 39-78,
at 2-3 (May 30, 1978) (emphasis added).
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youth directors who schedule events? Indeed, it is probably a fair
generalization that the majority of the employees of most
churches are not "primarily engaged in religious activities." If
churches do not meet this description, what type of organization
will do so?150
B. Definition of "Church"
It is generally considered that "a church or a convention or as-
sociation of churches" is the most religious of organizations, and
thus, usually receives the maximum protection given to religious
organizations. But what is "a church or a convention or associa-
tion of churches"?
In 1971, the Treasury proposed a regulation which would an-
swer this question for the purpose of ascertaining the deductibil-
ity of charitable contributions. The language of the proposed
regulation was substantially taken from a prior regulation dealing
with the term "church" for determining the tax on unrelated busi-
ness income. 15 ' The proposed regulation provided: "Generally, re-
ligious organizations, . . . if not themselves churches or
associations or conventions of churches, . . . are not churches
... ." The same was true of "all other organizations which are
organized or operated under church auspices." 52 In other words,
if an organization is not a church, it is not a church.
The next part of the proposed definition was a bit more de-
manding. Despite the preceding portion, a religious organization
would qualify as a church if it were "an integral part of a church"
and were "engaged primarily in carrying out the religious func-
tions of a church." In determining whether an organization met
the latter criterion, the IRS would consider whether its duties in-
cluded "the ministration of sacerdotal functions and the conduct
of religious worship" within the tenets of a religious body which
did constitute a church.153 The IRS withdrew this proposed deft-
150. Some states have taken issue with the Secretary's interpretation. The At-
torney General of Michigan stated that where a church-related school had no sep-
arate legal identity, so that employees who worked in the school were actually
employees of the church, not the school, the statutory exemption for church insti-
tutions would apply. If, however, the schools had a separate legal existence apart
from church institutions exempt under the statute, they would not be exempt
from unemployment tax. Op. MicH. Arr'Y GEN. No. 5434, at 6 (Jan. 19, 1979).
151. See note 160 infra, and accompanying text.
152. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 9298 (1971).
153. Id.
nition after receiving extensive protest from American
churches, 54 and merely specified that "a church or a convention
or association of churches" was "a church or a convention or asso-
ciation of churches."155
The emphasis on "sacerdotal functions" resulted primarily from
a distinction developed for purposes of the tax on unrelated busi-
ness income. When this tax was initially imposed on nonprofit or-
ganizations in 1950, the statute exempted "a church, a convention
or association of churches."'156 It was not clear whether or not re-
ligious orders were within this exemption.157 When the phrase "a
church or a convention or association of churches" was inserted
in section 170 of the Code, 158 pertaining to the deductibility of
charitable contributions, the staff of the Joint Committee stated:
"The term 'church' is intended to include religious orders as well
as other organizations which, as integral parts of the church, are
engaged in carrying out the functions of the church, whether as
separate corporations or otherwise."159
A Treasury regulation issued in 1958 explained the term
"church"'160 for purposes of section 511, which imposes tax on un-
154. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problem,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 917 (1977).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(a) (1973).
156. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 948 (amended, formerly
codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 421(b)(1)(A)). This language was incorporated
in the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 511(a) (2) (A), 68A Stat. 169, where it re-
mained until removed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §
121(a)(1), 83 Stat. 536 (codified at I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(A)).
157. See Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Prob-
lem, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 906-07 (1977).
158. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 170(b)(1)(A)(i), 68A Stat. 58, amended by
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a) (1)(B), 83 Stat. 550 (codified at
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)).
159. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INT, REV. TAXATION, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
SUMMARY OF THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (H.R.
8300) AS AGREED TO BY THE CONFEREES (PUBLIc LAW 591, 83D CONG.) 19 (Comm.
Print 1955).
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2(a) (3), T.D. 6301, 1958-2 C.B. 197, 222-23. A relevant por-
tion of the regulation read as follows:
(ii) The term "church" includes a religious order or a religious organi-
zation if such order or organization (a) is an integral part of a church, and
(b) is engaged in carrying out the functions of a church, whether as a civil
law corporation or otherwise .... A religious order or organization shall
be considered to be engaged in carrying out the functions of a church if its
duties include the ministration of sacerdotal functions and the conduct of
religious worship. If . . . an order or organization is not authorized to
carry out the functions of a church (ministration of sacerdotal functions
and conduct of religious worship) then it is subject to the tax imposed by
section 511 whether or not it engages in religious, educational, or charita-
ble activities approved by a church. What constitutes the conduct of reli-
gious worship depends on the tenets and practices of a particular religious
body constituting a church. If a religious order or organization can fully
meet the requirements stated in this subdivision, exemption from the tax
imposed by section 511 will apply to all its activities, including those
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related business income. The regulation stated that "church" in-
cluded a religious order or organization which was "an integral
part of a church" and was "engaged in carrying out the functions
of a church." For a religious order or organization to meet the lat-
ter criterion, its duties had to include "the ministration of sacer-
dotal functions and the conduct of religious worship" within the
tenets of an organization which constituted a church. Religious,
charitable, or educational activities approved by a church would
not qualify a religious order or organization as a church for pur-
poses of this regulation. Once a religious order or organization
had fully met the requirements of the regulation, the exemption
from tax on unrelated business income applied to entities which
it wholly owned, provided they were not primarily operated as a
trade or business for profit.
The regulation's distinction between "religious activities" and
"the ministration of sacerdotal functions and the conduct of reli-
gious worship" was very useful for the Treasury. It enabled the
IRS to tax the wine and brandy business of the Christian Broth-
ers, who are not ordained as priests, but to exempt the income of
a particular commercial television station operated by a Jesuit
university, because some Jesuits are ordained as priests. The
university was highly regarded by key congressional figures, 161
and its station obtained special protective legislation in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969.162 The Christian Brothers lacked similar po-
which it conducts through a separate corporation (other than a corpora-
tion described in section 501(c) (2)) or other separate entity which it whol-
ly owns and which is not operated for the primary purpose of carrying on
a trade or business for profit.
161. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problem,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 910-11 (1977). The station, WWL-TV, was operated by
Loyola University in New Orleans, which was highly regarded by a powerful mem-
ber of the House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Hale Boggs, Jr., and
of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Russell Long. Id.
162. When this Act subjected churches to the tax on unrelated business in-
come, a special provision was added to the Internal Revenue Code which, though
not naming the television station, described it in very specific terms, and allowed
it to maintain its exempt status. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(b) (2) (C), 83 Stat. 540
(current version at I.R.C. § 512(b)(15)). I.R.C. § 512(b)(15) reads as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (4) [pertaining to debt-financed prop-
erty), in the case of a trade or business-(A) which consists of providing
services under license issued by a Federal regulatory agency, (B) which is
carried on by a religious order or by an educational organization described
in section 170(b)(1)(A) (ii) maintained by such religious order, and which
was so carried on before May 27, 1959, and (C) less than 10 percent of the
net income of which for each taxable year is used for activities which are
not related to the purpose constituting the basis for the religious order's
litical protection.
When a corporation, De La Salle Institute, whose members
were all members of the Christian Brothers Order, challenged the
assessment of tax on the unrelated business income from its wine
and brandy business, the court upheld the imposition of tax.163
The court tacitly accepted the essentiality of sacerdotal functions
to church functions by observing that Christian Brothers did not
perform sacerdotal functions, stating: "The functions of the Chris-
tian Brothers Order are educational and religious. These func-
tions are not 'church' functions in the sense intended in the
statutory language."164 Since the statute used the term "church"
and not "religious organization," the court concluded that a more
restrictive meaning was necessarily required. Mere religious
functions were insufficient to qualify an organization for the pre-
ferred tax status. 65
A regulation, written to deal with a particular set of facts, ap-
plies far more generally thereafter. One wonders how the regula-
tion would have been written had the Christian Brothers been
ordained as priests, or had a lucrative wine and brandy business
been run by Humanists who claimed exemption from the unre-
lated business income tax as a church.
The definition of "a church or a convention or association of
churches" was discussed for purposes of section 170(b) (1) (A) (i),
pertaining to the deductibility of charitable contributions, in
Chapman v. Commissioner.166 The Tax Court stated: "We are not
here concerned with the question as to what constitutes a 'reli-
gion' within the purview of the first amendment of the Constitu-
tion; we are solely concerned with divining what Congress
intended when it granted an additional 10-percent allowance for a
special class of charitable contributions." 167 The court deter-
mined that although the organization in question, the Missionary
Dentist, was clearly a religious organization, it did not qualify as
"a church or a convention or association of churches." It inter-
preted this phrase as corresponding to the terms "denomination"
or "sect." Because the Missionary Dentist was interdenomina-
tional, it did not meet this test. 68
exemption, there shall be excluded all gross income derived from such
trade or business ....
Continued exclusion depends on the organization's charging rates competitive
with those charged by nonexempt organizations.
163. De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
164. Id. at 905.
165. Id. at 898.
166. 48 T.C. 358 (1967).
167. Id. at 361.
168. Id. at 363-64. See note 98 supra.
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One concurring opinion, in which two judges joined, stated that
the Missionary Dentist was not a church because it did not meet
the requirements imposed by the regulations under section 511,
dealing with unrelated business income. There was no proof that
the members of the organization ministered sacerdotal functions.
Furthermore, religious services conducted by the evangelical
teams sent out by the organization were not conducted "accord-
ing to the 'tenets and practices of a particular religious body'" be-
cause they were interdenominational. 169 A second concurring
opinion, in which another judge joined, stated that the Missionary
Dentist was not a church because "the critical element of spiritual
togetherness is missing." Because of the general nature of the
testimony regarding the organization's religious services, the im-
portance of those services in the totality of the organization's ac-
tivities could not be determined. 170 There was no dissent.
What all these opinions had in common, though they used dif-
ferent legal reasoning, was, of course, that an organization known
as the Missionary Dentist was not a "church." The average indi-
vidual would probably reach this conclusion without the aid of
any legal reasoning.
The attempts to define a church's function have tended to limit
governmental perception of this function to the Catholic mass,
presumably including communion in Protestant services, and
other functions such as baptisms. This is understandable in light
of controlling political factors which dictated taxation of unrelated
business income of Christian Brothers, but not Jesuit, institu-
tions. This does not, however, make it acceptable under the es-
tablishment clause.
The categories which have emerged from the interpretations
discussed can be described as: sacerdotal, religious, and nonreli-
gious. A church must have the first of these as a primary pur-
pose. Here the problem of "incidental functions" begins to arise.
As the court stated in De La Salle Institute v. United States, "The
tail cannot be permitted to wag the dog. The incidental activities
of plaintiff cannot make plaintiff a church."l7 1 What if a Presbyte-
rian church only serves communion once a month, over a period
of half an hour? Can this be said to be other than an incidental
function? To prove that it is not, are courts entitled to examine
169. Id. at 366-67 (Dawson, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 368 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
171. 195 F. Supp. 891, 901 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
church law to determine the importance of the communion cere-
mony within the church's theology? What if they should decide
that it is not very important? What if church members testify that
church sacraments are not an important reason for their member-
ship in the church?
Then, of course, there is the problem presented by churches
where the only activities which might be termed sacerdotal are
weddings, funerals, and perhaps a naming ceremony.1 72 Are not
these functions incidental in the truest sense? Yet can the gov-
ernment assert that an organization is not a church because it
lacks a sufficiently priestly character? Churches, as we have seen,
are not even "religious" in a substantial part of their activities, let
alone "sacerdotal."
Early in 1978, Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of the Internal Rev-
enue Service, said that of all the difficult judgments IRS must
make, one of the most difficult concerns questions of religion. He
said that in recent years there had been an attempt to isolate and
distill from cases criteria which would determine whether an or-
ganization was a church, but that beliefs and practices varied so
widely that IRS had been unable to come up with a single defini-
tion.17 3
The criteria which the IRS National Office has developed for de-
termining whether an organization is a church are these, though
an organization need not meet all criteria:
(1) a distinct legal existence, (2) a recognized creed and form of worship,
(3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (4) a formal code of
doctrine and discipline, (5) a distinct religious history, (6) a membership
not associated with any other church or denomination, (7) a complete or-
ganization of ordained ministers ministering to their congregations and
selected after completing prescribed courses of study, (8) a literature of
its own, (9) established places of worship, (10) regular congregations, (11)
regular religious services, (12) Sunday schools for the religious instruction
of the young, and (13) schools for the preparation of its ministers. 17 4
These criteria tend to require an organization to be a developed
denomination according to the pattern reflected in the most ac-
cepted mainline churches. They do not recognize the substantial
departure from this structure among a number of religious organi-
zations which have long been recognized as American
172. E.g., Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 128
(D.C. Cir. 1957). There are a number of recognized religious denominations which
do not specially train and ordain priests or ministers, such as Christian Science
and certain assemblies of Quakers.
173. Address by Jerome Kurtz, Practising Law Institute Seventh Biennial Con-
ference: Tax Planning for Foundations, Tax-Exempt Status and Charitable Contri-
butions (Jan. 9, 1978), reproduced in DAILY EXECUTIVES REP. (BNA) J-8 to J-10
(Jan. 11, 1978).
174. B. HOPKINS, THE LAw OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 134 (3d ed. 1979).
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churches. 175 Furthermore, over more than the last decade, there
has been the development of "house churches" among Protes-
tants, Catholics, and some Jews, who seek community, less struc-
ture, and hopefully, more authentic spirituality. Few could argue
that these churches do not embody the religion of most of those
who belong, yet such churches may not meet many of the criteria
established by the IRS National Office.
Christ and His band of disciples certainly did not meet these
criteria. An examination of the relevant references indicates that
the Biblical church which was in the home of Priscilla and Aq-
uila 7 6 would not qualify for tax exemption under these tests. It is
perhaps never wise to define a religion based on its developed
state, since its early state is not only its most fluid, but usually its
most delicate and important. It is precisely then, in this larval
stage, that a particular religion needs to have the benefits of reli-
gious protections.
These criteria provide the basis for an unconstitutional estab-
lishment of religion. They do not establish a particular creed, to
be sure, but they establish a finely specified structure as a re-
quirement for the protections afforded to churches. There seems
to be no constitutionally compelling argument that organizations
with this structure should receive religious protections while
other less organized "churches"-as that word is commonly un-
derstood-are denied them. What these criteria tend to do is limit
the religious scene to the denominations already in existence, in
violation of the establishment clause.
A definition of "church" by any government agency is fraught
with constitutional dangers. More than 150 years ago, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall issued the memorable words, "That the power to tax
involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may de-
feat and render useless the power to create ... are propositions
not to be denied."'1 77 The same is true of the power to define. If
government can define what is a "church," it can also define what
is not a church, and can do so in a manner which excludes reli-
gions which are not favored by government officials. The very
175. E.g., Quakers and Christian Scientists. See Whelan, "Church" in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problem, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 925-26
(1977).
176. See 1 Corinthians 16:19.
177. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
existence of such a power would be unconstitutional under the
establishment clause.
In testimony submitted to the Senate Finance Committee in
1954, Mr. Eugene Butler of the National Catholic Welfare Confer-
ence stated that a particular classification in the Internal Revenue
Code would result in "a legislative determination of what is or is
not a church. This the Congress has never done. This would be a
dangerous precedent.178 The Treasury regulation which deline-
ated certain boundaries for the term "church" was substantially
designed to please those who held political power. 79 It is not to
be supposed that a more far-reaching definition would be any less
subject to such pressures. If our nation has managed to get along
without a government definition of "church" until now, it seems
that it should be able to continue to do so.
C. The Impact of the First Amendment upon the
Characterizations Developed by Government
In some areas, the manner of categorizing various types of reli-
gious institutions has not been perceived as raising constitutional
issues, because constitutional rights or prohibitions have not
been at stake. This was true in Chapman v. Commissioner,180 in
which the court stated that it was not trying to determine the
scope of "religion" under the first amendment, but merely at-
tempting to construe a statute regarding charitable contribu-
tions.181 The allowance or disallowance of an additional 10% of a
taxpayer's contribution base as a charitable contribution does not
seem to be a matter of constitutional import. The author of one
concurring opinion stated: "I recognize that my emphasis on spiri-
tual togetherness as a characteristic of a 'church' might well pres-
ent problems if we were dealing with a constitutional question
"182
The tax on unrelated business income is another area where
constitutional requirements have not been involved. At the time
churches were exempt from this tax, the term "church" was de-
scribed in corresponding Treasury regulations. 83 The fact that
the National Council of Churches and the United States Catholic
178. Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1028 (1954).
179. See notes 160-62 supra, and accompanying text.
180. 48 T.C. 358 (1967).
181. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
182. Chapman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 358, 368 (1967) (Tannenwald, J., concur-
ring).
183. See note 160 supra, and accompanying text.
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Conference requested that this exemption be removed184 makes it
appear unlikely that a challenge to the constitutionality of this tax
would be successful. In such a case, the manner of classifying re-
ligious institutions does not appear as crucial as where a constitu-
tional issue is involved.
Yet the distinctions in the regulations under the unrelated busi-
ness income tax illustrate how an establishment clause problem
can develop even in a matter which is not one of intrinsic consti-
tutional import. Under the regulations, the tax was imposed on
religious orders without ordained priests, but not on those with
ordained priests. The court in De La Salle Institute v. United
States rejected the first amendment challenge raised by the plain-
tiffs, who asserted that an unconstitutional requirement of ortho-
doxy had been imposed. The court basically said that the line
had to be drawn somewhere, and that it would not hold unconsti-
tutional the line which had been drawn.185 Both the taxed and
the exempted orders involved were Roman Catholic. Had the reg-
ulation been drawn so as to exempt Protestant organizations but
not Catholic organizations, an establishment clause problem
would have been created. Furthermore, there is a tendency for
categorizations which have developed in nonconstitutional areas
to carry over into constitutional areas, thus giving these categori-
zations a certain amount of inevitable constitutional impact.
In other areas, constitutional requirements or prohibitions are
directly at issue when statutes are applied to religious institu-
tions. This is the case in the current dispute over the definition of
"integrated auxiliary." As discussed,186 a church-related organiza-
tion included in this category need not file an annual return of
financial information with the Internal Revenue Service. A
church-related organization, other than a church, which is outside
the integrated auxiliary category must generally file such returns.
In maintaining the exemption from this requirement for
churches, the Senate stated that churches were exempt "in view
of the traditional separation of church and state."'1 87 This implies
that the Senate felt constitutional issues of church-state separa-
184. Whelan, Government and the Church, 139 AMERICA 450 (1978).
185. De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 904-05 (N.D. Cal.
1961).
186. See notes 124-44 supra, and accompanying text.
187. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX REFORM ACT OF
1969, COMPILATION OF DECISIONS REACHED IN EXECUTIVE SEss. 53 (Comm. Print
1969).
tion would be raised if churches were required to file annual
financial returns with the government.
The issue of financial oversight has been judicially considered
primarily in cases involving government's dealings with church-
related schools and colleges. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an arrangement which
would, in some cases, require the government to examine the ex-
penditures of parochial schools and determine which were secu-
lar and which were religious.188 In Tilton v. Richardson,189 on the
other hand, a program of federal construction grants which in-
cluded church-related colleges was held constitutional. In evalu-
ating such grants under the excessive entanglement test, the
Supreme Court stated: "There are no continuing financial rela-
tionships or dependencies, no annual audits, and no government
analysis of an institution's expenditures on secular as distin-
guished from religious activities. Inspection as to use is a mini-
mal contact."19o A recent First Circuit decision barred the
Secretary of Consumer Affairs of Puerto Rico from obtaining in-
formation from Roman Catholic schools as part of an investiga-
tion of costs of private schools.191
The Court in Lemon recognized that Catholic elementary
schools are "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catho-
lic Church."192 If the Constitution restricts governmental exami-
nation of the financial records of church schools in conjunction
with funding programs or investigations of costs, it is true a forti-
ori that government is restricted in examining the financial affairs
of churches pursuant to an information return requirement. This
limitation is based not only on the free exercise clause,193 but also
on the establishment clause, which precludes excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion.194
Because the Secretary has exempted parochial schools from
the filing requirement, litigation of the constitutionality of this re-
quirement for parochial schools is precluded. Nevertheless, the
school aid cases clearly show that institutions affiliated with
churches may be "an integral part of the religious mission" of a
particular church, and may be religious institutions for purposes
of the first amendment, even though their principal purpose is not
188. 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
189. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
190. Id. at 688.
191. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
192. 403 U.S. at 616 (quoting the district court in the same matter, DiCenso v.
Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
193. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1979).
194. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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"exclusively religious" as specified in the regulation defining inte-
grated auxiliary. The question then arises as to when a church-
related institution is a religious institution for purposes of the
first amendment, i.e., an institution with which government can-
not deal except within the parameters established by the religion
clauses.
The free exercise clause has been held to embrace actions
which are not "religious" for purposes of the establishment
clause, but which spring from religious belief.195 It is submitted
that the charitable, welfare, educational, and similar enterprises
traditionally carried on by churches and their affiliated institu-
tions should be held to constitute protected activities within the
purview of the religion clauses. This approach is consistent with
judicial interpretation of the free exercise clause; and with the po-
sitions taken in real property tax exemption and zoning cases,
which recognize the true breadth of church activities. 96
The status of such institutions under the establishment clause
cannot be as readily generalized. Without passing on what the
law should be, it is sufficient to note that it is well established in
case law that church-related colleges 197 and hospitals' 98 do not
fall under the same prohibitions against government aid as do pa-
rochial schools, though of course no institution may receive aid
for religious purposes. Though "religion" must logically mean the
same thing in both religion clauses, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized a kind of distinction between establishment and free exer-
cise: "The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion
are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated
by the Free Exercise Clause. To equate the two would be to deny
a national heritage with roots in the Revolution itself."199
It is further submitted that the elaborate definitional process in
which the government determines whether a church-related or-
ganization is "operated primarily for religious purposes" or is "ex-
clusively religious"-and defines "religious" as excluding the
categories of charitable, educational, or literary-constitutes ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion. It thus
195. See notes 3, 11-13 supra, and accompanying text.
196. See notes 88-91, 104-06, 111-12 supra, and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
198. See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
199. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
violates the establishment clause. The Supreme Court in Lemon
refused to allow a state government to examine a parochial
school's expenditures and determine which were secular and
which were religious, based upon considerations of entangle-
ment.200 Are state officials more competent to judge the religious
nature of activities than they are to judge the religious nature of
expenditures? A limitation in the expenditure area mandates a
limitation in the area of activities. Furthermore, government defi-
nitions of religion or religious institutions presuppose that gov-
ernment is empowered to impose upon society its conceptions in
this area, contrary to our basic principles of religious liberty.20 1
Once it is established that the free exercise clause applies to
church institutions which are not strictly "religious," such as so-
cial welfare organizations, it is clear that governmental action
may work to infringe upon these organizations' free exercise
rights. The tests which have been developed under the free exer-
cise clause, 202 such as a compelling state interest, can then be ap-
plied to see if the infringement is justified. For instance, a court
would probably hold that there is a compelling state interest in
assuring that hospital patients receive adequate care. Thus, a
church-related hospital could presumably be subject to govern-
mental regulation in this area, even though it was recognized as a
religious institution for purposes of the free exercise clause.
On the other hand, it seems quite likely that no compelling
state interest would be found to justify requiring church-related
hospitals to submit annual returns of financial information to the
federal government. In a recent First Circuit decision which re-
jected a governmental attempt to obtain information from a paro-
chial school, the court stated: "[Als has long been recognized,
'compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infring-
200. 403 U.S. at 620. The Court said: "This kind of state inspection and evalua-
tion of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of
entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dan-
gers of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of churches."
Id.
201. Thomas Paine, in his influential pamphlet Common Sense, wrote: "As to
religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of government to protect all consci-
entious professors thereof, and I know of no other business which government
hath to do therewith." L. PFEFFER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 13 (1977). Isaac Backus, a
Baptist minister who wrote in 1774 against a Massachusetts tax to support the
Congregationalist Church, stated:
The free exercises of private judgment, and the unalienable rights of con-
science, are of too high a rank and dignity to be submitted to the decrees
of council, or the imperfect laws of fallible legislators ... religion is a con-
cern between God and the soul with which no human authority can inter-
meddle.
Id.
202. See notes 7-10 supra, and accompanying text.
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ing the exercise of First Amendment rights.' "203 The court com-
mented that the governmental agency seeking the information did
"6not even claim, nor could it, in our opinion, that the general in-
terests which the Department serves rise to the level of those
which have been found to outweigh First Amendment religious
freedoms." 204
IV. CONCLUSION
The free exercise clause of the first amendment has been held
to embrace actions which, though not religious in themselves,
spring from religious belief. Not every action which may be con-
sidered mandated by religious belief is protected. In order to
limit such action, however, the state has been required to demon-
strate a "compelling state interest" sufficient to outweigh the
state's very great interest in preserving first amendment free-
doms. The establishment clause is considered to encompass reli-
gious matters which are not associated with formal institutional
religion, as well as those which are. Although there is a difference
between the scope of practices covered by the establishment and
free exercise clauses, this difference may be seen as a difference
between the terms "establishment" and "free exercise," rather
than between "religion" in the two clauses. No formal definition
of "religion" under the first amendment has been developed; in-
stead, specific criteria have been avoided to prevent a limitation
on the first amendment which would, in itself, be unconstitu-
tional.
The core religious institution, a "church," also has not been pre-
cisely defined. Nevertheless, criteria have been developed which
tend to require a complex structure before an organization can
qualify as a "church" under the Internal Revenue Code. In addi-
tion, numerous religious categories have been developed which
tend to limit the definition of "church" since they separately de-
fine various church-related organizations.
To allow the government to define "church" would pave the way
for an unconstitutional establishment of religion, by giving legal
force to government's religious perceptions. Such a definition
does not appear useful in defending against fraud; a person who
203. Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 1979) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976)).
204. 604 F.2d at 80.
was clever enough might be able to meet even a carefully
constructed definition. Instead of proving that an organization is
not a church, based on application of a particular definition, the
Internal Revenue Service should prove, for example, that it is a
fraud.205 Tax fraud is a matter with which the Service must per-
petually deal in numerous areas, and the doctrine of looking to
the substance of a transaction, not merely its form,206 is well es-
tablished for tax purposes.
Furthermore, the tendency to narrow governmental under-
standing of "church functions" to "sacerdotal functions"-by de-
fining organizations which do not perform "sacerdotal functions"
as not being churches-is one which should be resisted. This ten-
dency serves to place the government in the unconstitutional po-
sition of determining what are, and what are not, the proper
religious functions of churches. To be consistent with judicial in-
terpretation of the free exercise clause, and with cases interpret-
ing zoning and real property tax exemption statutes, the functions
of churches should be understood to encompass many activities
which are not even religious, not to mention sacerdotal.
Thus, the free exercise clause should be considered to apply to
the institutions formed by churches to carry on their traditional
charitable, educational, welfare, and other activities. For govern-
ment to decide that because an institution's principal purpose is
not "exclusively religious," the institution does not qualify for
free exercise protection, is contrary to the basic and well-estab-
lished principle that free exercise is not limited to "religious
acts." Furthermore, statutes which create detailed classifications
of religious institutions in accordance with a perceived degree of
"religiosity" run the risk of excessive government entanglement
with religion. A government which is precluded on entanglement
grounds from separating the religious and nonreligious expendi-
tures of a church-related institution207 should also be precluded
from determining which institutions are integral to a church's re-
ligious mission.208
205. The utility of such an approach was recognized in Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963
(1969). There the court stated, in dictum:
Any primafacie case made out for religious status is subject to contradic-
tion by a showing that the beliefs asserted to be religious are not held in
good faith by those asserting them, and that forms of religious organiza-
tion were erected for the sole purpose of cloaking a secular enterprise
with the legal protections of religion.
409 F.2d at 1162.
206. See, e.g., Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
207. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
208. Accord, Statement of James E. Wood, Jr., Executive Director, Baptist Joint
Comm. on Pub. Affairs, at Internal Revenue Service Hearing on the Proposed Reg-
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The above principles, combined with common sense, should
serve to promote a constitutional understanding of "religion" and
"religious institutions" for purposes of the first amendment with-
out the aid of a ready-made, pocket definition of "religion" or
"church." Such a definition would ultimately disserve the first
amendment interests it was allegedly designed to advance.
ulations Under Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code Relating to Definition of
Integrated Auxiliaries of a Church, Washington, D.C. (June 7, 1976), at 5:
Congress [in using the term "integrated auxiliary"] intended that there be
a determination of a relationship. This the Treasury is competent to do.
Congress did not intend that the Treasury either assess activities or deter-
mine whether those activities are integral to a church's religious mission.
Only a church itself can perform that task.

